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HOW (AND HOW NOT) TO USE COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
COURSES 
MARK TUSHNET* 
Law faculties seem increasingly interested in figuring out how to 
incorporate non-U.S. legal materials in basic courses.1  Doing so may increase 
students’ sophistication about the different ways societies have for organizing 
themselves—their rules of property, torts, contracts, and (of course) 
constitutional law.  It may also prepare them for working with lawyers trained 
in other national traditions, whose sensibilities about what law should look like 
and how courts should behave may be very different from those of students 
trained in the U.S.  Yet, as anyone who has even dabbled in comparative law 
knows, the task of incorporating non-national material in a nationally oriented 
course is not an easy one.  Facile comparisons are easy; serious ones difficult.  
Differences in cultures, in legal traditions, and in institutional arrangements 
other than the one being compared at the moment all require great caution in 
suggesting to U.S. law students that they can become better lawyers by 
knowing a little bit about non-U.S. law.2 
I begin this Essay by briefly describing good and bad ways of 
incorporating non-U.S. law in a basic course on Constitutional Law.3  The 
remainder of the Essay works through a number of examples of doing so in a 
 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. For example, the Association of American Law Schools will hold a one-day workshop at 
its 2006 Annual Meeting on integrating non-U.S. materials into first-year courses.  AALS 
Calendar, at http://www.aals.org/aalscal.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
 2. I refer here to non-U.S. law to indicate that my methodological concerns go to efforts to 
incorporate international public law, and particularly customary international law, in the basic 
Constitutional Law course, although I will not discuss that sub-topic in this essay. 
 3. Teachers in the field know that basic Constitutional Law courses come in a number of 
variants.  My discussion of substantive areas indicates that my comments are applicable to all the 
variants—the comprehensive survey dealing with both issues of structure and issues of individual 
rights (in either a one-semester or two-semester version) or separate courses on structure and 
individual rights (the latter sometimes divided into courses on due process, equal protection, and 
the First Amendment). 
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good way.4  At the outset, I have to make the obvious point that the more of 
one thing one does in a class, the less one can do of something else.5  Each 
teacher will have to decide whether the trade-offs attendant to adding 
references to non-U.S. materials are worth it.  This is particularly important for 
someone with a deep comparativist sensibility, who will want to ensure that 
references to non-U.S. materials come with a sufficiently full account of the 
institutional, cultural, and legal-tradition background to be accurate 
descriptions of those materials.  As a general matter, I suggest that the 
sacrifices in coverage of U.S. material that a fully comparativist sensibility 
would require is rarely likely to be worth it.  I will therefore suggest what I 
think of as “light” ways of referring to non-U.S. materials in teaching basic 
Constitutional Law courses. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent references to non-U.S. 
materials may induce teachers to use such materials badly.  In discussing the 
Eighth Amendment’s requirement that punishments reflect “evolving standards 
of decency,”6 the Court has mentioned that many jurisdictions outside the 
United States treat infliction of capital punishment on persons with mental 
retardation as inconsistent with fundamental human rights norms.7  This was 
only a mention, but it was enough to provoke a substantial reaction, including a 
legislative proposal to make judicial reliance on non-U.S. materials in the 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution ground for impeachment.8 
The Court’s mention of non-U.S. law, while arguably appropriate in the 
precise doctrinal context of the Eighth Amendment, can be used to illustrate a 
 
 4. The organization of topics tracks that in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (4th ed. 2001), and most of the examples are drawn from material in VICKI C. JACKSON & 
MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999). 
 5. An additional preliminary point is that many of the questions I raise here by referring to 
non-U.S. law could be raised by referring to decisions under state constitutional law in the United 
States.  See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999).  Teachers who know more state 
constitutional law than I do might well choose to refer to that body of law rather than to 
comparative materials.  They would have the advantage of not facing skepticism about cultural 
differences that might make such references irrelevant to the law of the United States 
Constitution.  The downside of referring to state constitutional law is that it does not connect the 
domestic constitutional law course to wider interests in “globalizing” the law school curriculum. 
 6. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 8. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004). 
  In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the 
United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive 
order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or 
international organization or agency, other than the constitutional law and English 
common law. 
Id.  See also id. § 302 (stating that engaging in an activity prohibited by § 201 “shall be deemed 
to constitute” an impeachable offense). 
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common, but undesirable, use of non-U.S. materials in U.S. constitutional law.  
I call this use “nose-counting on bottom-line results,” which involves doing 
nothing more than counting up the number of jurisdictions in which a 
particular rule—usually, one different from a U.S. rule with which the person 
doing the nose-counting disagrees—has been rejected.  The thought appears to 
be that the very fact that so many other jurisdictions do things differently is a 
reason for adopting their rule as ours.  There are a number of difficulties with 
nose-counting on bottom-line results.  It is not clear to me, for example, why 
the counting rule is Westphalian—each jurisdiction, no matter what its size or 
global importance, counts equally—rather than weighted by population or in 
some other way.  Nose-counting also is entirely insensitive to differences in 
constitutional language, and, more broadly, to differences in constitutional 
traditions.  And, more concretely, nose-counting is insensitive to the 
institutional arrangements by which constitutional doctrine is implemented.9 
Two intuitions might lie behind nose-counting.  One is that certain 
components of constitutionalism are universal—normatively desirable no 
matter what the language of a nation’s constitution says, no matter what its 
traditions are, no matter what its institutional arrangements are.  If so, the fact 
that a large number of jurisdictions has converged on a particular doctrine or 
practice might indeed provide support for the proposition that that doctrine or 
practice is one of the components of constitutionalism as such.  Yet, such a 
claim about universalism, controversial in itself, is unlikely to be at all 
illuminating about any particular constitutional issue in U.S. law.  The reason 
is that particular issues arise at a level of detail as to which general 
propositions provide little purchase.  Constitutionalism may require that judges 
be independent of direct political control, for example, but does that mean life 
tenure, long nonrenewable terms, or something else?  Constitutionalism may 
require the protection of freedom of expression, but does that mean that hate 
speech must be allowed—or prohibited?  An instructor who wants to include 
reference to non-U.S. material in the basic Constitutional Law course might 
want to note, briefly, the universalist intuition lying behind nose-counting, but 
she should not make much of it. 
The other intuition behind nose-counting is more defensible, although in 
the end nose-counting in the sense of toting up the number of jurisdictions that 
do things one way rather than another is not what the intuition is about.  The 
second intuition is this: Among the world’s stable democracies, many do 
things differently from the way we do them in the United States.10  Students 
 
 9. For a discussion of the latter problem in connection with constitutional questions about 
the regulation of hate speech, see Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some 
Cautionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004). 
 10. The restriction to stable democracies is one feature that distinguishes this approach from 
nose-counting, where the nature of a jurisdiction’s regime has no bearing on whether its nose gets 
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often have a sense that the only—or, less strongly, the most—defensible way 
to organize a democracy is the way the U.S. government is organized.  The fact 
that other stable democracies are organized differently can be used to raise 
questions about this sense. 
In the terms used by comparativists, noticing that things are done 
differently elsewhere might raise for students the question of whether their 
sense that things have to be the way they are is simply the product of a limited 
imagination—a sense, in the jargon, of false necessity.  It is important to 
emphasize even at this point, though, that this is simply a question, to which 
the answer might be “no,” indeed it is not the product of a sense of false 
necessity, because on reflection, the way we do things here is indeed 
necessary, given who we are, how we do other things, and the like.”  Consider, 
for example, the issue of cruel and unusual punishment.  Sanford Levinson has 
suggested that, to the extent we—or theorists of criminal punishment—believe 
that one justification for inflicting punishment is expressive,11 the fact that the 
United States uses capital punishment more readily than other jurisdictions do 
and uses it on offenders who are not subject to capital punishment even in 
jurisdictions that authorize the practice, may be diagnostic of who we are, a 
way into figuring out what it is we are expressing through our practices that 
people elsewhere either do not express or express differently.12 
The best use of non-U.S. materials in a basic Constitutional Law course 
would rely on the second intuition lying behind nose-counting.  One would 
identify practices or doctrines in other stable democracies that are different 
from those in the United States, and ask: “They do things differently there.  
What reasons might they have for adopting their practices or doctrines?  What 
reasons might there be that caution against our adopting those practices or 
doctrines?”  The remainder of this Essay provides a catalogue of topics as to 
which this sort of reference to non-U.S. materials might be profitably made, 
with some attention paid to topics as to which it would probably not be 
profitable. 
I.  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
To begin at the beginning: There is a package of issues associated with the 
very idea of judicial review.  Until recently, the practice of judicial review of 
legislation had to be contrasted with systems of parliamentary supremacy, 
 
counted.  The restriction is important, as well, to put to one side the natural reaction to reference 
to practices of unstable regimes, or undemocratic ones, that the regime with the practice being 
examined is so unattractive that its practices are presumptively undesirable. 
 11. The proposition that expressivism can justify inflicting punishment is controversial 
among those who think systematically about issues of punishment. 
 12. See Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some 
Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004). 
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which are sufficiently far from the experience of U.S. law students to make 
comparisons extremely difficult.  Recent innovations in the institutions of 
judicial review provide opportunities to ask students to defend the U.S. system 
of judicial review more carefully (or to think seriously about whether the U.S. 
system should be redesigned).  Stephen Gardbaum has described these 
innovations as the “new Commonwealth model” of judicial review.13  For 
pedagogic purposes, the Canadian “notwithstanding” mechanism is the easiest 
to describe.  That mechanism allows a legislature to override specific 
constitutional provisions by majority vote, in legislation that sunsets after five 
years, a period that necessarily encompasses an election in which the voters 
can decide whether they approve of the legislature’s action.14  Instructors could 
ask about the suitability of an override mechanism for the United States.15  The 
nation’s size, the discipline (or not) of our politicians, and much more might 
come up in the discussion, thereby illuminating the reasons for choosing or 
rejecting the form of judicial review presently employed.16 
A related question that comes up early is that of life tenure for judges.  
Recent controversies over Supreme Court nominations and Senate filibusters 
of appellate court nominations can be used to suggest some problems 
associated with life tenure, such as the incentives it gives to propose and 
oppose relatively young nominees.  Other systems of ensuring judicial 
independence exist, and students might be asked to think about the benefits and 
disadvantages of such practices as long but nonrenewable terms for judges or a 
mandatory retirement age (and/or minimum age requirements), which are 
employed in other stable democracies with judicial review.  This seems an 
appropriate point to note the obvious: Some of the issues raised by bringing in 
non-U.S. materials can be raised by asking whether it would make sense to 
amend the Constitution, for example, to substitute long nonrenewable terms for 
life tenure.  What the non-U.S. material can do is offset one common mode of 
fighting the hypothetical, which involves claiming that amending the 
Constitution in that way would be fundamentally inconsistent with deep ideas 
 
 13. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 707 (2001). 
 14. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), 
§ 33.  It might be worth noting for students that Robert Bork offered a similar proposal for the 
United States.  ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH 117 (1996). 
 15. This could be done early in the course, when basic issues of the relationship between 
democratic self-governance and judicial review arise, or later, in connection with the 
interpretation of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641 (1966), might have been read to allow Congress to override at least some constitutional 
interpretations offered by the Supreme Court; the Court rejected this “substantive” reading of 
Katzenbach in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 16. This discussion could also include some consideration of the difficulty of enacting 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution and of the ways in which easier amendment rules could be a 
substitute for provisions like the Canadian override. 
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about democracy and the rule of law.  The fact that stable democracies reject 
life tenure for constitutional court judges shows that that concern can be put to 
one side, making it easier to address the other questions associated with life 
tenure. 
II.  JUSTICIABILITY 
Something similar can be said about using non-U.S. materials on 
adjudicatory procedures—particularly standing—to raise questions about U.S. 
justiciability requirements.  Here, I think, a valuable way of using non-U.S. 
materials would be to set up and motivate the discussion of U.S. standing 
doctrine.  Before discussing the U.S. standing cases, an instructor could 
describe the Canadian reference procedure, which allows the government to 
seek an opinion from the Canadian Supreme Court on constitutional 
questions,17 or the practice of a priori review of enacted but not yet legally 
effective legislation in France and elsewhere.  The discussion could explore the 
advantages and disadvantages of such procedures as a prelude to examining 
U.S. standing doctrine.  That examination will bring out ideas such as the 
desirability of a concrete case to focus attention on the real-world 
consequences of legislation.  The instructor could then describe “fast-track 
review” procedures in U.S. law, such as the one used to ensure relatively quick 
Supreme Court consideration of the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold 
campaign finance legislation,18 or more typical procedures of ex parte 
temporary restraining orders used to enjoin the enforcement of recently 
enacted legislation, followed by preliminary and permanent injunctions that 
seek to prevent any real enforcement case from ever arising.  The instructor 
can return to the non-U.S. material to ask whether, in light of U.S. standing 
doctrine in its full development, there is enough left to the arguments for a 
distinctive “case or controversy” approach to support the proposition that, as a 
matter of good constitutional design and decent constitutional interpretation, 
the United States should not and could not adopt reference or similar 
procedures.19 
 
 17. The reference procedure has been used, for example, to ask whether a single Canadian 
province can secede unilaterally.  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.  At this 
writing a reference on the constitutionality of laws denying marriage to same-sex couples is 
pending. Tonda MacCharles, Same-Sex Shift Significant; Ottawa Backs Couples’ Claim Suit 
Filed in Newfoundland, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 16, 2004, at AO8. 
 18. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437h note (West Supp. 2004). 
 19. I doubt it would be productive in a basic course to introduce non-U.S. materials on 
political-question-like ideas.  Such materials raise the question of whether there is a significant 
difference between political-question dispositions and holdings on the merits that give substantial, 
even near-total, deference to the decisions of the political branches.  Answering that question, 
though, probably requires a detailed examination of the actual results and holdings of the non-
U.S. cases that would not be worth the sacrifice of coverage it would entail. 
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III.  FEDERALISM 
Next, instructors could use Justice Breyer’s foray into the comparative 
constitutional law of federalism to point out some of the difficulties of using 
non-U.S. material as support for interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.  In 
Printz v. United States, Justice Breyer referred to German federalism in 
explaining why, in his view, the Court’s anti-commandeering principle was not 
compelled by the exigencies of federalism as such.20  German federalism, 
Justice Breyer pointed out, was founded on commandeering, that is, the 
administration of national law by state-level officials.21  He argued that 
German constitutionalists believe that such arrangements provide more robust 
protection for state-level interests than does the administration of national law 
by national-level bureaucracies.22  Justice Breyer’s characterization of the 
German system was accurate, but the lessons to be drawn from German 
arrangements are less clear than he suggested.  The reason, as Daniel 
Halberstam has pointed out, is that the German länder have a higher degree of 
direct representation in the German policy-making process than U.S. states do 
in our national policy-making process.23  Or, put in terms that students should 
know, the political safeguards of federalism are stronger in Germany than in 
the United States.  Justice Breyer’s comments on German federalism can be 
used to enter a note of caution about relying on bottom-line results without 
paying attention to the larger institutional surrounding and to press home the 
importance of political safeguards in evaluating constitutional federalism.24 
IV.  SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The federalism issue raised by Justice Breyer’s reference to German 
constitutional law, and the problems with that reference, suggest another 
cautionary note: The details of institutional structure play a large role in 
questions of basic constitutional design, such as choices about federalism and 
 
 20. 521 U.S. 898, 976–78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 976. 
 22. Id. at 976–77. 
 23. Daniel Halberstam, “Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,” in 
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 235–38 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001). 
 24. My sense is that the dormant Commerce Clause is playing a decreasing role in basic 
Constitutional Law courses.  Full coverage of the topic is difficult because of its doctrinal 
intricacy.  Even in a stripped down version, though, the dormant Commerce Clause materials 
introduce students to the distinction between regulations of trade that are intended to impair out-
of-state economic interests and those that, though arguably adopted for nondiscriminatory 
reasons, have a disproportionate adverse impact on out-of-state interests.  An instructor might 
point out that the same distinction has come to play a large role in international trade law.  That 
would provide a helpful introduction for students who go on to take a course in international trade 
law, but I doubt that doing much more than mentioning the parallels is worthwhile. 
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the separation of powers.  Reference to non-U.S. materials may not be terribly 
helpful to the extent that the U.S. and non-U.S. constitutional law on those 
subjects requires one to understand the important details.  It is hard enough to 
be sure that one’s students have a firm grasp on the structures of the U.S. 
government and of course even harder, probably impossible, to be confident 
that they will have any real understanding of the structures of government 
elsewhere. 
Even so, a sufficiently “light” use of non-U.S. materials might help frame 
discussion of some aspects of the U.S. law of separation of powers.  In 
teaching the separation of powers materials, I focus primarily on the 
relationship between Congress and the President and spend relatively little 
time on questions relating to the judicial role in specifying the constitutional 
contours of that relationship.25  The re-introduction into the basic 
Constitutional Law course of issues relating to the exercise of power in a time 
of national emergency does provide the opportunity to draw lightly on non-
U.S. experience, particularly because other reasonably stable democratic 
societies have confronted questions of the threat terrorism poses to national 
security over a longer term than the United States. 
There are two questions here, both of which arise in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.26  
First, to what extent may the executive act without legislative authorization?  
Second, what substantive limits does a nation’s constitution place on actions 
taken either on the executive’s sole authority or on the authority given the 
executive by the legislature?  There are numerous cases from around the world 
that address these issues, but an interesting recent one is the decision of the 
Israeli Supreme Court dealing with aggressive methods of interrogating those 
suspected of participating in terrorist activities.27  That court held that the use 
of such techniques was illegal because it was unauthorized by any 
parliamentary legislation, but it refrained from determining whether the use of 
those techniques violated the substantive protections afforded people by the 
nation’s basic law.28  This decision can be characterized as adopting a 
separation-of-powers approach to the use of emergency powers rather than a 
substantive approach.  Hamdi can be framed similarly, with its first part 
adopting a separation-of-powers approach in finding that Congress had 
authorized Hamdi’s detention and its second part adopting a substantive 
 
 25. My reason is that, like federalism, this too seems to me an area where the political 
process is the primary (albeit not exclusive) mechanism by which the Constitution determines the 
relationship.  Having used the federalism materials to discuss the judicial role in an area where 
the political process is primary, I find it unnecessary to repeat the discussion in the separation of 
powers area. 
 26. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 27. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471. 
 28. Id. at 1485. 
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approach to the procedures to be used to determine whether Hamdi’s continued 
detention was predicated on the grounds for which Congress authorized 
detention.29  Students can be asked to think about the advantages and 
disadvantages of the separation-of-powers and substantive approaches by 
comparing the Israeli interrogation decision with Hamdi.  The non-U.S. 
material at least thickens what is otherwise a thin, purely domestic, “database” 
on these questions. 
V.  INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—FREE SPEECH 
I turn now to issues of individual rights, again noting the pitfalls of making 
universalist assumptions about what abstract “human rights” are when they are 
specified in particular cultures and institutional arrangements.  As I indicated 
earlier,30 I believe that this is a real difficulty with many references to non-U.S. 
law in U.S. scholarship on freedom of expression.  It may be interesting for 
students to learn that many constitutional systems appear to have adopted a 
rule that governments can penalize statements critical of government policy 
only if rather stringent conditions are satisfied.  Knowing that, however, does 
not help students understand the distinction between the clear-and-present-
danger test and the Brandenburg test, a distinction important in U.S. law but 
not attended to closely in the non-U.S. decisions, nor—perhaps more 
important—whether, as Staughton Lynd put it, Brandenburg provides a free-
speech test “for all seasons,”31 that is, for all problems of freedom of 
expression. 
Perhaps the best, and perhaps the only good, vehicle for introducing non-
U.S. law in the free expression context is the law of libel.  A line or two in 
class observing that many common law jurisdictions have criticized the U.S. 
version of libel law after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan32 for many of the 
reasons domestic critics have provided may induce students to give the 
domestic critics a fairer hearing than otherwise.  A brief observation that the 
German Constitutional Court, in constructing that nation’s libel law, treats the 
interest in human dignity that is impaired by libelous statements as one of 
constitutional magnitude may help students understand what is truly at stake in 
libel law, when their vision might be obscured by the egregious facts of the 
New York Times case. 
 
 29. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2633. 
 30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 31. Staughton Lynd, Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons?, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 151, 190 (1975). 
 32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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VI.  INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS—SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
For obvious reasons, the issue of the constitutional regulation of abortion 
plays a large role in nearly every basic Constitutional Law course.  There is a 
large and accessible literature on the comparative constitutional law of 
abortion, and supplementing the U.S. materials with short excerpts from that 
literature can be quite productive.  Mary Ann Glendon’s analysis of continental 
abortion law, while now dated, still can provide a helpful conduit into a 
discussion of whether some approach to the constitutional issue, one, in 
Glendon’s terms, more amenable to compromise, might have been (or might 
still be) more desirable than the approach the U.S. Supreme Court has taken.33  
And, of course, that discussion would allow the instructor to raise questions 
about whether compromise on constitutional questions is desirable in general, 
or within U.S. legal culture. 
More complicated, and arguably not worth the trade-offs in coverage, is 
the current position of the German Constitutional Court on the issue of 
abortion.  Briefly,: in Germany, abortion must be made a criminal offense, but 
there are many circumstances in which it is inappropriate, and therefore 
unlawful, to prosecute a woman or an abortion-provider for having or 
performing an abortion.34  The government must set up a system in which 
women thinking about obtaining an abortion receive directive counseling 
aimed at discouraging them from doing so.35  In addition, the government must 
provide a rather extensive system of social support for mothers and their young 
children, to reduce the likelihood that the prospect of straitened economic 
circumstances will lead pregnant women to seek abortions.36 
Some forms of directive counseling, although seemingly milder than those 
required in Germany, are permissible under current U.S. law.37  If time 
permits, an instructor could point out that the German Constitutional Court 
relied on the requirement for directive counseling as a reason for holding that 
actually penalizing those who obtained or performed abortions would be 
inappropriate; doing so, the Court said, would drive abortion provision 
underground, to be performed without directive counseling, and so might 
actually increase the incidence of abortion.  This raises interesting questions 
about the trade-offs in constitutional policy that U.S. doctrine makes.  
Alternatively, one could use the German material to raise questions about the 
 
 33. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). 
 34. Id.at 10-63. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) 
(finding constitutional a requirement that physicians inform pregnant women of the availability of 
state-prepared printed materials “describing the fetus and providing information about medical 
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies 
which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion”). 
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notions of choice and coercion that underlie the U.S. position on directive 
counseling: Would more forceful directive counseling than that upheld in 
Casey impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s right to choice?  Is the 
German form of directive counseling inappropriately coercive or burdensome?  
Addressing those questions might allow the class to see whether or how 
notions of choice and coercion can vary from one society to another. 
VII.  SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS 
The German requirement for significant social support for mothers and 
their children is obviously connected to another issue that arises in U.S. 
constitutional law; that is, whether social welfare rights—including rights to 
education, housing, and social support—are judicially enforceable.  My 
experience in teaching cases such as Rodriguez38 and Dandridge v. Williams39 
is that students are extremely skeptical about the feasibility of judicial 
enforcement of social welfare rights because of their polycentric nature and in 
particular because of their effects on government budgets and priority setting. 
Some comparative materials might be helpful in displacing the sense that 
social welfare rights cannot be enforced judicially.40  The Grootboom decision 
of the South African Constitutional Court has been particularly influential in 
discussions of enforcing social welfare rights.41  There, the court rejected the 
argument that that nation’s constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights 
created substantive entitlements to what the court called a “minimum core” of 
social provision, but it upheld a claim that South Africa’s system of providing 
housing—which was guaranteed by the constitution—was unconstitutional 
because it failed to include a component that would guarantee housing for the 
desperately needy.42  What makes Grootboom so interesting is its holding on 
the remedy required given the constitutional violation.  The case required the 
government, not to provide housing for the desperately needy right away, but 
to develop a plan for building houses for them, a plan that would presumably 
be subject to judicial review for its adequacy.43 
Grootboom suggests that social welfare rights might be enforced in ways 
other than through orders directly affecting government budgets or policy 
setting.  The Grootboom remedy appears to be an example of a larger class of 
emerging remedies in constitutional cases, including some in the United 
 
 38. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 39. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 40. These materials could also be connected to earlier discussions, if any, of forms of 
judicial review weaker than the form we are accustomed to in the United States.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 13–16. 
 41. Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SALR 46, 69–70 (CC). 
 42. Id. at 66, 79. 
 43. Id. at 86. 
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States.44  My own judgment is that it is important, simply as a matter of basic 
education, to make sure that our students know of the existence of these new 
remedial mechanisms.  Beyond that, discussing such remedies can help 
students think about what they think it means to say that a person has a 
constitutional right.  Is it inconsistent with the U.S. idea of constitutional rights 
to deny immediate effect to orders finding constitutional violations?  This 
question can be raised as well in connection with the remedy applied in Brown 
v. Board of Education45 and can be linked to any prior discussion of whether 
constitutional compromises on the issue of the right of reproductive choice are 
consistent with U.S. understandings of constitutional rights.46 
VIII.  STATE ACTION 
Constitutional courts around the world have confronted the problem 
addressed in the United States under the heading of state action.  The typical 
solution is to give constitutional provisions what those courts call indirect 
horizontal effect, that is, to use constitutional provisions as a basis for 
interpreting and developing non-constitutional law.  The discussions of the 
state-action problem in other constitutional systems are extremely interesting, 
but I doubt that it would be useful to refer to them when teaching the U.S. state 
action cases.  For one thing, those cases are hard enough on their own; 
introducing other ways of addressing the problem would probably distract 
students from the task of understanding the U.S. doctrine on its own terms.  In 
addition, the structure of U.S. constitutional law, which commits the 
development of ordinary law to state legislatures and courts, makes unavailable 
the prevailing solution of indirect horizontal effect.  Still, it might be worth 
mentioning to students that the state-action problem is pervasive in modern 
constitutional systems, arising from the difficulty of maintaining a line 
between private activities and public regulation in a world where public 
regulation is pervasive even if not all-encompassing. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Of course the foregoing examples do not constitute a comprehensive list of 
topics where comparative references might enhance the basic course in 
constitutional law.  Other teachers could find materials on affirmative action, 
gay rights, the rights of women, the rights of indigenous peoples, and more that 
they could include in the basic course.  I do think it important to stress once 
again that including these references entails some trade-offs, and that faculty 
and student concerns about coverage counsel in favor of what I have called 
relatively “light” uses of comparative materials.  An instructor could introduce 
 
 44. State court decisions on education funding and adequacy are examples here. 
 45. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
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many of the examples I have provided with a few sentences in class, or in a 
handout of no more than a page.47  We should not claim too much for such 
references, but I believe that they would enhance our students’ education. 
 
 47. My sense is that, of the examples I have given, only the Israeli General Security Services 
case, the German abortion example, and Grootboom would require handouts of substantial length. 
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